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CLARIFYING THE DOCTRINE OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
ELIZABETH I. WINSTON*

A. Introduction
During Judge Michel's first year on the bench, Judge Nichols wrote that "the
habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become
an absolute plague." 4 3 Cognizant of the importance of this issue, Judge Michel, the
author of more than twenty opinions addressing inequitable conduct, 44 told the
American Intellectual Property Law Association that:
[H]e felt a "burden of responsibility" to [clarify the doctrine of inequitable
conduct] particularly. . . the interpretation of materiality and intent-to-deceive.
"There are four different standards of materiality. That's a terrible train wreck right
there and makes the problem four times harder," he said. 45
With a month left in Chief Judge Michel's tenure on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Court took, perhaps, a big step towards ending
the plague by granting en banc review in Therasense v. Becton Dickinson.46
Addressing squarely the issue of the multiple standards of materiality in inequitable
conduct litigation, Therasense raises many difficult issues that could be clarified
through the lens of the analogous concept of fraud on the Trademark Office. The
standards for finding fraud on the Trademark Office lack the ambiguity found in the

*Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. The author was privileged to
clerk for the Honorable Paul R. Michel on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to whom this
article is dedicated. His leadership and guidance has been invaluable over the years, and is deeply
appreciated.
43 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
4Judge Michel was the author of more than twenty opinions addressing inequitable conduct
including: Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc., 606 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Star
Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Brady Const.
Innovations, Inc. v. Perfect Wall, Inc., 290 F. App'x. 358 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,
480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., 147 F. App'x. 158 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Quantachrome
Corp. v. Micromeritics Instrument Corp., 15 F. App'x. 848 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Monon Corp. v.
Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elec. Co. 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Interactive Tech., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 194 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon
Corp., 139 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Destron/IDI, Inc. v. Elec. Identification Devices, Inc., 121 F.3d
726 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Zeneca Ltd. v. Novapharm Ltd., 111 F.3d 144 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Lumenyte Int'l
Corp. v. Cable Lite Corp., 92 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Carbide Blast Joints, Inc. v. Rickert
Precision Indus., Inc., 73 F.3d 379 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Concept Design Elec. and Mfg., Inc. v.
Duplitronics, Inc., 52 F.3d 342 (Fed. Cir. 1995); SGS-Thomson Microelec., Inc. v. Int'l Rectifier Corp.,
31 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Grp., Inc., 917 F.2d 538 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Schering Corp. v. Optical
Radiation Corp., 867 F.2d 616 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
45 JmsNurton, Chief Judge Urges Inequitable Conduct Review, Managing Intellectual
Property, AIPLA DAILY REPORT, Oct. 16, 2009, available at http://www.managingip.com/
pdfs/02_IPLA_DC_Fri.pdf.
46 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton-Dickinson & Co., 374 F. App'x. 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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doctrine of inequitable conduct, despite the parallel penalties of unenforceability and
requirements of proof of materiality and intent.
Judge Michers jurisprudence is tremendous in its depth and breadth. The
author of more than 800 opinions during his twenty-two years on the bench, Judge
Michel brought clarity to the law through his opinions, his public speaking, and his
engagement with the bench and bar. Informed by the many decisions of Judge
Michel, the essay below touches on inequitable conduct, Judge Michel's contribution
to "law, equity and ethics-a pretty heady mix," 4 7 and concludes that the standards
for finding fraud before the Trademark Office, as set forth in In re Bose,48 light the
path the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should follow in
Therasense,49 setting workable standards for finding inequitable conduct before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office.
B. Multiple Inequitable Conduct Tests
A patent is an exclusive right conferred by the United States government to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts. When that right is procured
through fraud, the patent may be held unenforceable. 50 An applicant has a duty to
disclose to the Patent Office "all information known to that individual to be material
to patentability," pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 ("Rule 56"). Intentional failure to do so
can result in a finding of inequitable conduct "the penalty for [which] is so severe,
[resulting in] the loss of the entire patent even where every claim clearly meets every
requirement of patentability."5 1
If a patent is procured through inequitable conduct, it is unenforceable. To
prevail on inequitable conduct, a party must show that the applicant for patent: "(1)
made an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material
information, or submitted false material information, and (2) intended to deceive the
[PTO]."52
The inequitable conduct doctrine, a judicially created doctrine, was borne out of
a series of Supreme Court cases in which the Court refused to enforce patents where
the patentees had engaged in fraud in order to procure those patents. Although the
Supreme Court did not articulate precisely what rendered a patent unenforceable,
the courts generally tended to apply a doctrine somewhat akin to that of common law
fraud, albeit broader. That is, the courts required a showing that the information
which was misrepresented to or withheld from the PTO was material as well as a
showing of wrongfulness, such as deceptive intent, willful misconduct, or gross
negligence. In 1949, the PTO created its first version of Rule 56, prohibiting fraud

47 Paul R. Michel, Therasense: A Post-Argument Debriefing, Panel at the Catholic University
of America (Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://video.law.edultherasense.cfm.
48
In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
49 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton-Dickinson & Co., 374 F. App'x. 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
50 Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("Patent applicants are required to prosecute patent applications with candor, good faith, and
honesty.").
51 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
52 Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc., 606 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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before the PTO.53 Neither the Supreme Court nor the PTO, however, articulated
exactly what constituted a material misrepresentation. 54
There is no one standard for what is "material" or what it means to intend to
deceive the Patent Office. This "train wreck"55 has led to great confusion among the
bar as to the appropriate standard to apply to determine materiality, a question
squarely before the full Federal Circuit, which heard Therasense v. Becton
Dickinson5 6 en banc on November 9, 2010.57 Reflecting on these difficult issues, the
parties were asked to argue the following questions:
1. Should the materiality-intent-balancing
conduct be modified or replaced?
2.

framework for inequitable

If so, how? In particular, should the standard be tied directly to fraud or
unclean hands? If so, what is the appropriate standard for fraud or
unclean hands?5 8

3. What is the proper standard for materiality? What role should the
United States Patent and Trademark Office's rules play in defining
materiality? Should a finding of materiality require that but for the
alleged misconduct, one or more claims would not have issued?
4.

Under what circumstances
materiality?5 9

is

it proper

to infer

intent

from

5. Should the balancing inquiry (balancing materiality and intent) be
abandoned?
6.

Whether the standards for materiality and intent in other federal
agency contexts or at common law shed light on the appropriate
standards to be applied in the patent context.60

As Judge Michel stated to the American Intellectual Property Law Association,
there are multiple tests for what constitutes inequitable conduct. 6 '
These standards included:
the objective "but for" standard, where the
misrepresentation was so material that the patent should not have issued; the
subjective "but for" test, where the misrepresentation actually caused the examiner
§ 1.56 (1951).
Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006). This
opinion was authored by Judge Clevenger and joined by Judge Michel.
5 Nurton, supra note 45.
56 374 F. App'x. 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
57 Id.
58 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); HazelAtlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), overruled by Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
59 See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en
banc).
60 Therasense, 374 F. App'x. 35.
61Nurton, supra note 45.
5 See 37 C.F.R.
54
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to approve the patent application when he would not otherwise have done so; and the
"but it may have" standard, where the misrepresentation may have influenced the
patent examiner in the course of prosecution. In addition, in 1977, the PTO amended
Rule 56 to clarify the duty of candor and good faith before the PTO.62
Each of these standards is discussed further below.
The "But-For" Test
"A person attacking the validity of a patent for alleged fraudulent
representations must prove that the representations were material- that the patent
would not have issued but for the representations." 63 This test can be objective,
"where the misrepresentation was so material that the patent should not have
issued," or subjective "where the misrepresentation actually caused the examiner to
approve the patent application when he would not otherwise have done so." 64 This is
the most stringent of the tests for inequitable conduct, requiring knowledge of the
examinets actual thinking process. If the misrepresentation is a failure to disclose
prior art, inequitable conduct subject to the "but for" standard will be very difficult to
prove. A recent law review article details empirical findings that "patent examiners
effectively ignore almost all applicant-submitted art, relying almost exclusively on
prior art they find themselves." 65 The "but for" standard makes it very difficult to
prove that omission of a reference was the cause of the issuance of a patent,
particularly in light of the findings that examiners find their own searches more
reliable than submitted references. The impact of imposing such a stringent
interpretation renders the inequitable conduct tool virtually useless.
The "Reasonable Examiner" Standard
[I]n 1977, the PTO amended Rule 56 to clarify the duty of candor and good faith
before the PTO.66 That version of Rule 56 required applicants to disclose material
information they are aware of, and stated that information is "material where there
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in
deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent."6 7 In adopting this
standard of materiality, the PTO did not claim to be replacing or supplanting the
existing case law addressing materiality, but rather noted that it was "codif[ying] the
existing Office policy on fraud and inequitable conduct, which is believed consistent
with the prevailing case law in the federal courts." 68

Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Waterman-Bic Pen Corp. v. W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 267 F. Supp. 849, 856 (D. Del. 1967).
64
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315.
65 Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the
Presumption of Validity (Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1656568.
66 Id.
67 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977).
68 Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977) and Duty of Disclosure, 42 Fed. Reg. 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977)).
62
63

[10:277 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

294

Judge Michel wrote in 2008 "that information is material when a reasonable
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to
issue as a patent."69 Materiality was defined by the Patent Office as existing when
there was "[1] a substantial likelihood that [2] a reasonable examiner [3] would
consider it important [4] in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a
patent."70 This test is less stringent than the "but for" standard, which allows a
lower burden of proof.71 If the reference is one the examiner would have considered
important, but may not have been critical to the issuance, then the question becomes
one of the level of intent of the patent applicant since "a finding of inequitable
Thus, where "a
conduct requires a balancing of materiality and intent ....
reasonable examiner would merely have considered particular information to be
important but not crucial to his decision' the requisite finding of intent must be
high."7 2
The "But it May Have" Standard
The least stringent test for materiality is the "but it may have" test where a
"misrepresentation may have influenced the patent examiner in the course of
prosecution." 73 This standard asks whether the misrepresentation "might reasonably
have affected the examiner's decision as to patentability." 74 This standard is a more
realistic standard than a strict "but for" analysis, but given the current balancing
test maintained between materiality and intent, this standard requires a higher
showing of intent.75 This test has been adopted by courts struggling with the
difficulty of proving what the examiner was thinking during patent prosecution. As a
result, under this test "even if the applicant misrepresents or withholds facts which
are not material in a 'but fot sense, the Courts will refuse to enforce the patent if the
applicant has misrepresented to the Patent Office facts which may be relevant to an
issue of patentability."76
An early phrasing of this test stated that
"'Materiality' . .. does not require that the patent would not have issued as a matter
of law 'but for' the misrepresentation or concealment, but only that the
misrepresentation or withholding be relevant to an issue of patentability."77
69 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(citations omitted).
70
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1983)).
71 Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("This court has
long held that whether a prior reference is material, i.e., whether there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable examiner would have considered the reference important in deciding whether to
allow the application to issue as a patent, is not controlled by whether that reference actually
anticipates the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious.").
72
Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315-16 (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 136263).
73I. at 1315.
74
Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 933, 939-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
7 Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("If these thresholds are satisfied, the trial court balances materiality and intent to determine
whether the equities warrant the conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred.").
76 Gemveto Jewelry, 542 F. Supp. at 940-41.
77Id at 940.
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37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) - the "Duty of Candor" test
"Patent applicants are required to prosecute patent applications with candor,
good faith, and honesty."7 8 This statement reflects the current Rule 56, as revised in
1992, to "present a clearer and more objective definition of what information the
Office considers material to patentability"7 9 setting a standard of materiality based
on what is cumulative. The current rule reads:
(a) ... Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the
Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known
to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this
section . . . .
(b) Under this section, information is material to patentability when it is
not cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in
the application, and (1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or (2) It
refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i)
Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii)
Asserting an argument of patentability.80
This test supplements the other standards, leaving it unclear whether
applicants must abide by the strict "but for" standard, the more relaxed "reasonable
examine?' standard, the lenient "but it may have" standard or some other test. As
Judge Michel stated "patent applicants do have certain duties to the PTO, including
duties of disclosure, beyond a certain point, how much more evidence to submit is in
large part a determination for which a patentee and his agents must use good
judgment. While there are certainly many factors which could go into such a
decision, a duty to the PTO may not necessarily be one of them."81
C. Trademark Law: In re Bose82
In 2009, Judge Michel authored In re Bose, setting forth the standard for finding
fraud during the prosecution of a trademark application before the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. 8 3 Inequitable conduct requires defrauding the Patent
Office during prosecution of a patent. Committing fraud on the Trademark Office
parallels this doctrine. 84 "Fraud in procuring a trademark registration or renewal
78 Semiconductor Energy Lab., 204 F.3d at 1373.
7 Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(quoting the Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992)).
80 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2010).
81

Id.

82 580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
84 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2006) (If the right to "use the registered mark has become incontestable
under section 1065 of this title, the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's
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occurs when an applicant knowingly makes false, material representations of fact in
connection with his application."85
The Lanham Act imposes a duty on applicants that they cannot make
"knowingly inaccurate or knowingly misleading statements" with no discussion of the
materiality of these statements.8 6 Proof of fraud requires a showing of materiality,
but unlike inequitable conduct, the question of materiality has not been one of debate
in the trademark context. There are not multiple standards, and the prevailing
jurisprudence applies a fairly lax standard, along the lines of the "but it may have"
standard.
Intent is required in all claims of fraud under the Lanham Act. It does not
matter how material the misleading statement is, "[tihere is no fraud if a false
misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence
without a willful intent to deceive."8 7 As Judge Michel wrote, "deception must be
willful to constitute fraud."8 8 The high burden of proving intent can be met only
when "the applicant or registrant knowingly makes a false, material representation
with the intent to deceive the PTO."89 Such proof can be formed of "indirect and
circumstantial evidence. But such evidence must still be clear and convincing, and
inferences drawn from lesser evidence cannot satisfy the deceptive intent
requirement."90
D. The ParallelPaths of Fraudand Inequitable Conduct
in Trademark and PatentLaw
The final question posed in the Therasense en banc order asks whether "the
standards for materiality and intent in other federal agency contexts or at common
law shed light on the appropriate standards to be applied in the patent context."9 1
The answer must be yes, and we can look to practice before the Trademark Office,
and Judge Michel's opinion in In re Bose, for just such guidance The standard for
determining whether fraud has occurred in the prosecution of a trademark is
analogous to the question of whether "patentees had engaged in fraud in order to
procure those patents."92 If the en banc order in Therasense is viewed in light of the
standards articulated by Judge Michel in Bose many of the questions raised in the
inequitable conduct context are clarified. 93
exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services
specified in the affidavit filed under the provisions of said section 1065 subject to any conditions or
limitations stated therein except when one of the following defenses or defects is established: (1)
That the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained fraudulently. .
85 Torres v. Cantine Torresella, 808 F.2d 46, 48 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
86
1n re Bose, 580 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Bart Schwartz Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 289 F.2d 665, 669 (C. C.P.A. 1961)).
871d. at 1246.
881d. at 1243.
891d. at 1245.
90 Id. (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
91 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton-Dickinson & Co., 374 F. App'x. 35, 36 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
92 Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
98 See Therasense, Inc., 374 F. App'x at 35-36, In re Bose, 580 F.3d at 1244-46.
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The materiality-intent balancing inquiry should be abandoned. There is no
balancing framework between materiality and intent present in trademark lawfraud requires proof of materiality and intent. Instead of balancing materiality and
intent, a threshold requirement for inequitable conduct should be a showing of
materiality and intent. Once that threshold has been met, even by a scintilla of
evidence, then the overall conduct of the applicant during prosecution should be
evaluated to see if it "warrant[s] holding the entire patent unenforceable." 94 If that
determination is made, then a finding of inequitable conduct may be justified.
A finding of fraud on the Trademark Office requires proof of materiality, but the
level of materiality required is analogous to the "but it may have" standard.
Inequitable conduct before the Patent Office should be analyzed under a similar
standard, not as stringent a standard of materiality as high as the "but for" standard
articulated. If the Examiner would profit from seeing the reference, then the public
would benefit, and therefore the reference should be found material. The Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure should inform what may have influenced the examiner.
Intent should never be inferred from materiality-the two doctrines are not
dependent on each other. If a highly material document is withheld, then an
inference of intent may be made, but it is only an inference, because "materiality does
not presume intent, which is a separate and essential component of inequitable
conduct."9 5 Again, the overall conduct of the applicant should be evaluated - and
that evaluation should not be based solely on the level of materiality of the withheld
document. Intent requires that "the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the
evidence ... indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive."96
E. Conclusion
Judge Michel wrote that "[t]o prevail on inequitable conduct, an accused
infringer must show that the applicant: '(1) made an affirmative misrepresentation of
material fact, failed to disclose material information, or submitted false material
information, and (2) intended to deceive the [PTO]."'97 In his decision, Judge Michel
referred to the Court's "scattered precedents"98 and the difficulty in determining
what is material and what level of intent is required.99 In contrast, Judge Michel's
decision in the determination of fraud on the trademark office sets forth a simple and
workable test. There is no question in trademark of a balancing test between
materiality and intent-if a misrepresentation is material-in that it may have
impacted prosecution-and there was intent to defraud the Trademark Office, then
the mark should not be enforceable.
In the patent context, the focus of inequitable conduct has been materiality,
while the focus in litigating fraud before the Trademark Office, the focus has been on
intent. The public would best be served by a focus on the overall behavior of the
94 Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

95I. at 1366 (quoting GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
96

Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir 1988) (en

banc)).

97 Leviton Mfg.
98 Id.

99Id

Co. v. Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc., 606 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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applicant. When an applicant appears to have met the statutory requirements for a
patent or a trademark but has done so by egregious behavior, the applicant deserves
the ultimate sanction of losing the right to enforce their patent or trademark. The
question should not be on whether the applicant withheld a sufficiently material
reference with malice aforethought, but rather an overall analysis of the behavior of
the prosecutor, after it has been proven that a material reference was knowingly
withheld from the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

